










LEGISLATIVE MALAPPORTIONMENT AND THE 
POLITICIZATION OF GERMANY’S 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1426 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              http://SSRN.com/abstract=680509




LEGISLATIVE MALAPPORTIONMENT AND THE 
POLITICIZATION OF GERMANY’S 





Legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a 
federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. 
Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to 
disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses 
empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system 
over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house 
receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does 
not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more 
important over time. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Following Harold Lasswell's famous dictum from 1936, the central inquiry of politics is, 
"who gets what, when and how?" (Lasswell 1988). One strand of research in political 
economy has therefore focused intensely on the political determinants of fiscal transfers and 
the division of favors among the states in a federal system. From a theoretical perspective the 
distribution of public spending and flows of net fiscal benefits may be severely influenced by 
a malapportionment of votes in legislatures. Put briefly, a disproportional representation of 
the states' population in legislative chambers produces asymmetric bargaining powers, 
favoring overrepresented units at the expense of underrepresented states. A number of 
empirical studies confirm this view and find a strong correlation between a disproportional 
representation of sub-central entities and an unequal provision of grants and federal 
expenditures per capita among states in the U.S. (Atlas et al. 1995, Lee 1998, Lee 2000, 
Knight 2004), Argentina (Porto and Sanguinetti 2001) and among countries in the European 
Union (Rodden 2002). 
 
One of the most interesting cases in this respect is Germany. Over the past decades the 
volume of Germany's system of intergovernmental transfers ('Länderfinanzausgleich, LFA') 
has increased substantially. In 1970, the total sum of horizontal and vertical redistributive 
transfer flows amounted to 0.3 % of GDP, it climbed to 0.4 % of GDP in 1990, and in 2000 it 
reached over 1.6 % of GDP in nominal terms. Obviously, this upsurge is driven to a large 
extent by German Unification and the inclusion of the relatively poor five new Länder and the 
city state of Berlin in the fiscal transfer system since 1995. Although the rise of total transfer 
volume may be subject to criticism by itself, economic scholars are mostly troubled with 
substantial inefficiencies of the transfer system, attributable to a far-reaching equalization of 
the state's financial positions and a sizable number of questionable regulations, favoring 
certain states at the expense of others (Homburg 1994, Huber and Lichtblau 2000). Some 
contributors discuss the political rationale behind interstate redistribution of fiscal revenues 
(Homburg 1997, Lenk and Schneider 1999, Blankart 2000, Pitlik and Schmid 2000). These   4 
papers suggest that political factors are at the heart of an explanation for the expansion and 
the direction of redistribution in the intergovernmental transfer system. This view is supported 
by a recent decision of Germany's Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2000), in 
which previous regulations of the system of intergovernmental transfers were declared to be 
partly unconstitutional. What is exceptionally remarkable is that the judges advised political 
decision makers to frame new rules with the aim of limiting free bargaining among state and 
federal officials in negotiations for fiscal transfers. According to the Court's opinion the 
allocation of tax receipts and fiscal transfers among the states as well as between the states 
and the federal level has to be isolated from political forces in the bargaining process.1 Pitlik, 
Schmid, and Strotmann (2001) show for the time period 1979-90 that there was sufficient 
scope for a political manipulation of transfer flows. Prior to German Unification a net 
distributional advantage of smaller states can in part be explained by extraordinary bargaining 
powers due to an overrepresentation in the upper house of the federal legislative. The impacts 
of German Unification on the political and economic determinants of intergovernmental 
transfers have not been examined so far, however. 
 
The present paper extends the study of Pitlik, Schmid, and Strotmann (2001) in various ways. 
First of all, the time period under consideration is expanded to include the years 1970-2002. 
Thus, we take account of the special circumstances in Germany after 1991 which changed 
substantially the economic and political environment under which the transfer system thus far 
operated. Secondly, we also consider the effects of the bicameral system in Germany as well 
as covariates modeling partisan affiliations of federal and state governments in our empirical 
research. Thirdly, we test for an over time change in the factors shaping the distribution of net 
gains. We attempt to investigate whether more complex transfer negotiations due to an 
increasing number of players had an impact on the relative importance of political influences 
as compared to economic considerations. Finally, from a methodological standpoint, instead 
of simple cross sectional regressions, we make use of the time series-cross section 
                                                 
1   If both chambers of the German federal legislative would not have agreed on new regulations until 2002 the 
entire transfer system would have been nullified. In 2001 delegates of the federal and the state level agreed 
to a severely critized reform that will be in effect on from 2005.   5 
information structure of the data by employing panel estimation techniques. The paper 
proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a very brief overview of the theoretical underpinnings of 
the malapportionment hypothesis. Section 3 shortly describes the evolution of fiscal 
federalism in Germany and reviews economic and political developments influencing the 




2  Malapportionment and the distribution of fiscal transfers 
 
Traditional economics highlights three basic rationales for the introduction of a system of 
intergovernmental grants (e.g. Oates 1999): (i) internalization of spillover effects, (ii) 
mitigation of interregional income differences, and (iii) absorbing economic shocks and 
offering interregional insurance by a redistributive transfer scheme. States providing benefits 
to other regions, economically weaker states, and states hit by adverse economic shocks 
should therefore receive higher transfers, ceteris paribus. 
 
Yet, these raisons d'être do not consider that real world intergovernmental transfer schemes 
are not made by benevolent maximizers of social welfare, but are instead the result of a 
complex exchange of favors by self-interested political actors. From a public choice 
perspective the central hypothesis is that, all else equal, "... grants go to those states with 
political agents with the most – and most valuable – political capital to sell" (Grossman 1994, 
p. 298). In this view, a state's net gain in the interregional redistribution game is shaped by its 
ability to supply political support in exchange for tax and transfer receipts. 
 
The structure of intergovernmental fiscal systems is typically decided on in a legislative 
bargaining process, based on a simple majority rule. As is well known from social choice 
theory, in each simple majority decision concerning distributional issues, serious cycling 
problems are prevalent (McKelvey 1976). In a highly influential paper, Baron and Ferejohn   6 
(1989) however show that stability may be achieved in a sequential legislative bargaining 
game. In their framework, one out of a total of N legislators is chosen randomly to propose a 
division of a fixed amount of money among the legislators. Each legislator represents one 
electoral district. After a proposal is made, the legislature is voting on it. If the proposer's 
offer is not accepted by a majority, the game goes on and a new proposer is selected randomly 
until a proposal is finally accepted. 
 
Building a minimum winning coalition for his proposal, a self-interested proposer makes an 
offer to a majority of agents that keeps these legislators indifferent between accepting and 
continuing the game. In order to maximize his own share, it is therefore sensible for the 
proposer to form a coalition that is composed of legislators whose votes are cheapest to get. 
The group of cheap suppliers of votes in the majority rule divide-the-dollar game consists of 
two classes of legislators, i.e., (i) agents with the lowest default pay offs, and (ii) legislators 
representing more votes per capita (c.f. also Persson and Tabellini 2000, pp. 166-167). 
 
The basic notion why these legislators are more likely to be included in the winning coalition 
is simple in both cases. Agents with a low pay off in case of a breakdown of negotiations are 
willing to accept worse offers than agents with a higher default pay off. Hence, poorer 
districts are expected to receive a disproportionately higher share of the cake. In addition, 
legislators representing more votes per capita demand a lower share of the total amount to be 
divided in order to please their respective districts population. If all legislators supply one 
vote to the proposer, smaller districts will be favored at the expense of more populated 
districts. More generally, overrepresented electoral districts, i.e. jurisdictions whose 
representatives offer more votes per capita in the legislative game as compared to the national 
average, have a higher chance of being included in the majority winning coalition. 
Malapportionment in the legislature may produce an unequal distribution of benefits per 
capita, where disproportionately higher shares go to overrepresented, i.e. typically smaller, 
states. 
   7 
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ting (2003) argue that this logic does not automatically apply to 
bicameral legislatures. In particular they note that if a proposal has to be accepted by a 
majority in both chambers of the legislature, an unequal distribution of funds among states 
due to a malapportionment in the upper house may be vetoed by a majority of representatives 
in a lower house in which representation is proportional to population. Ansolabehere, Snyder, 
and Ting (2003) however also show that a bias towards overrepresented states may re-occur 
under two conditions, i.e., (i) if decisions in a malapportioned legislative chamber require a 
supermajority, or (ii) if the proposal powers originate in the chamber with disproportional 
representation. 
 
Summing up so far, legislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among the 
member states of a federation are not only determined by economic reasons, but also to a 
substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Theory suggests that a disproportional 
representation of the states' population in the legislature under certain conditions leads to 
disproportionally higher benefits going to overrepresented states. 
 
 
3  The evolution of German Fiscal Federalism: an overview 
 
Since 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany experienced a remarkable process of 
centralization of competencies at the federal ('Bund') level (Blankart 2000). The system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations among jurisdictional tiers is still predominantly based on 
the fiscal constitution of 1969. It is characterized by a revenue sharing arrangement, covering 
about 75 percent of German tax revenues. Almost no tax legislation authority is left 
autonomously to the states. Some special tax receipts are allocated exclusively to the state or 
to the federal level. Revenues of joint taxes, which include the income tax, the corporation 
tax, and the VAT, are divided among all governmental tiers according to negotiated shares. In 
the horizontal dimension, income tax and corporation tax receipts are divided among the 
states according to a slightly modified residence principle, leaving little scope for interstate   8 
redistribution. This initial distribution of tax revenues builds the baseline for a further 
redistribution of financial resources among the states in a system composed of three stages. 
 
The basic structure of the redistributive transfer system can be summarized as follows. Article 
107/1 Basic Law demands that at least 75 percent of VAT proceeds are allocated among the 
Länder on a per capita basis. A residual of 25 percent serve as an improvement of the fiscal 
position of financially weaker states (stage 1). The second stage sets up a scheme of 
equalization transfers from wealthier to less wealthier states to correct remaining fiscal 
imbalances. This stage is characterized by various special provisions and exemptions in the 
political definition of the states' fiscal capacities and fiscal needs. Stage 1 and stage 2 are 
interdependent, as higher VAT receipts reduce received payments on the second stage. On a 
third stage, the central government donates specific grants ('Bundesergänzungszuweisungen', 
BEZ) to provide a supplementary coverage of certain states' special needs. In the 1980s a 
number of reforms came into effect on all three stages (see Renzsch 1991, pp. 261-279). 
These reforms included adjustments for the political definition of fiscal capacities, as well as 
the introduction of new categories and an increasing volume of special supplementary grants. 
Since 1987, major changes occurred, initiated by a Constitutional Court's decision in 1986 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 1986). 
 
Although German Unification in the fall of 1990 caused a dramatic change of the economic 
environment, the basic structure of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system remained 
virtually unchanged. In 1991, GDP per capita was roughly 2.3 times higher in the West 
(including Berlin) than in the East. The Contract of German Unification however did not 
establish a permanent regulation of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Germany. A special 
fund ('Fonds Deutsche Einheit') was set up as an interim solution to cover the pressing 
financial needs of the new states, including the city state of Berlin. Additional proceeds, 
however, were not financed by higher taxes but by a sizeable debt increase in the federal 
budget as well as several off-budget agencies. During 1991 to 1994, the fiscal transfer system 
among the old Western states was still in force, and an almost negligible and only temporary   9 
transfer scheme among the new Länder had been institutionalized. A further ruling of the 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1992) demanded the introduction of special 
supplementary grants to Bremen and Saarland in order to bail the two states out of a serious 
budgetary crisis. These Sanierungszuweisungen were introduced in 1994. Initially it was 
intended to donate grants only until 1998, but later donations were extended until 2004. 
 
In May 1993 a Constitutional Commission delegated the task of an incorporation of the new 
Länder into the fiscal transfer system to the state ministers of finance (Benz 1993, p. 887). 
The main conflict line concerning the vertical relation between the federal and the state 
administrations was the distribution of VAT shares. In this respect, the states formed a strong 
coalition against the Bund.2 As regards the horizontal distribution of revenues, the ministers 
of finance had to cope with a serious heterogeneity of interests. Numerous possible transfer 
schemes existed which would improve financial positions of a majority of states.3 Two topics 
have shown to be exceptionally problematic. Without a modification of the rules in effect 
integration of East German states would have turned former net winner states among the old 
Länder into net losers. Furthermore, Western states strongly opposed an equalization formula 
based primarily on economic conditions, as they could easily foresee that this would bring 
about a permanent subsidization of the weak new Länder. Eventually, delegates arrived at a 
compromise ('Federal Consolidation Program') coming into effect in 1995. Two notable 
changes occurred: Inclusion of the East German states into the system is accompanied by an 
introduction of new supplementary grants to the new Länder and Berlin. This goes along with 
payments benefiting some old states to compensate them for fiscal losses they expected to 
experience from integration. Thus, the system of intergovernmental transfers still contains 
                                                 
2   The federal ministry of finance conceded immediately to a higher VAT share of the Länder amounting to 
about DM 16 Billions. This was approximately the sum, the old states expected to lose by an incorporation 
of the new states on the first stage (Lenk 1999, p. 170). 
3   Lenk and Schneider (1999), for example, develop a revised transfers system, intended to reduce negative 
incentive effects. In contrast to many other proposals, mostly ignoring the political feasibility of a change, 
the argument Lenk and Schneider (1999) work out in favor of their proposal is that it alters financial flows 
in a direction which is supposed to achieve a majority of the involved states because it improves financial 
capacities.   10 
elements of equalization rules primarily based on economic conditions and on a number of 
unspecified formulas. 
 
Figure 1 shows initial, i.e. prior to redistribution, average per capita tax receipts of the 16 
Länder over the period 1995-2002. These include proceeds from all local taxes, own state tax 
sources and the states' shares of income and corporation tax revenues. For ease of comparison, 
equal per capita receipts over all states are normalized to 1. As can easily be seen from the 
chart, revenues in the five new Länder Brandenburg (BB), Saxony (SN), Mecklenburg-
Vorpomerania (MV), Saxony-Anhalt (ST) and Thuringia (TH) were considerably below 
national average.4 Berlin (BE), as well as Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Rhineland-Palatinate 
(RP), Lower Saxony (NI), and Saarland (SL) had tax receipts slightly below average, while 
per capita tax receipts of Hessen (HE), Baden-Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BY), Northrhine-
Westphalia (NW) and of city states Bremen (HB) and Hamburg (HH) were above average. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates net per capita gains of the states from the distribution of VAT revenues, 
horizontal equalization payments, and vertical supplementary grants, i.e., from the system of 
intergovernmental transfers in total over the period 1995-2002. Equal per capita gains across 
all states are normalized to 1.  
 
The East German states, including Berlin, benefited more than twice the national average 
from fiscal transfers per capita. In the group of Western states, Bremen received exceptionally 
high transfers, amounting to over three times the average, followed by Saarland (1.9 times the 
national per capita average). The remaining Western states gained below per capita average. 
 
 
                                                 
4   Lower tax revenues of the new Länder result both from a general economic weakness as well as a number 
of tax expenditures especially designed after German Unification to foster investment in East Germany.   11 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'New ' states and Berlin 'Old' states
BE BB SN MV ST TH HH HE HB BW BY NW SH RP NI SL
Source:  own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt  (var. issues)
 
Note: Initial tax receipts include all local and state taxes as well as states' shares of income 
and corporation tax. Nationwide average of per capita receipts normalized to 1. 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'New ' states and Berlin 'Old' states
MV ST TH SN BB BE HB SL RP NI SH NW BY BW HH HE
Source:  own calculations based on BMF (var. issues)
 
 
Note: Gains include VAT receipts, horizontal equalization payments and supplementary 
grants. Nationwide average of per capita gains normalized to 1.   12 
4 Empirical  investigation 
4.1  Hypotheses and descriptive statistics 
 
Theoretical research in legislative bargaining, as well as previous empirical studies, lead to 
the central hypothesis that states overrepresented in the legislature receive a higher share of 
total transfers per capita. The more citizens are represented by a legislative agent's vote, the 
higher per capita receipts a state is expected to receive in the transfer system (Hypothesis 1). 
 
The German intergovernmental transfer system is based on federal law that has to be accepted 
by majorities in the lower (Bundestag) and in the upper chamber (Bundesrat) of the federal 
legislature. Members of the Bundestag are popularly elected from sub-national districts and 
state party lists according to a mixed-member proportional formula. The Bundesrat represents 
the Länder and is composed of delegates that are appointed exclusively by state governments. 
The number of votes in the Bundesrat depends on state size. Whereas smaller states currently 
do have only three votes, more populous states hold up to six seats in the upper chamber. Yet, 
representation in the upper chamber is still far from proportional to population. 
 
As can often be observed in federal systems, legislative malapportionment in Germany is 
substantially higher in the upper chamber than in the lower chamber.5 Figure 3 depicts 
malapportionment in the Bundesrat (black bars) and the Bundestag (gray bars) as an average 
over the years 1995-2002. Proportional representation is normalized to 1. In the upper 
chamber all new Länder including Berlin are overrepresented, although to a different degree. 
Among Western states, Bremen (5.4), Saarland (3.3), and Hamburg (2.1 times the average) 
are considerably overrepresented in the Bundesrat. Delegates of these three states jointly 
represent only 4 percent of total population but 13 percent of total votes in the upper chamber. 
Northrhine-Westphalia, the most underrepresented state in the Bundesrat, has a population of 
18.1 Millions, representing almost 22 percent of total population but less than 9 percent of 
                                                 
5   During 1970-2002 the Loosemore-Hanby index of disproportionality in the Bundesrat is almost constantly 
about 0.25, while in the Bundestag it takes values about 0.025, indicating a much higher disproportionality 
of representation in the upper chamber.   13 
upper chamber votes. Representation of states in the Bundestag is obviously much more 
proportional to population. Averaged over 1995-2002 the representation index lies in a range 
between 0.9 (Baden-Württemberg) and 1.3 (Thuringia). 
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Note: Proportional representation normalized to 1. 
 
Germany's upper and lower chamber of the legislature further differ with respect to specific 
concerns of representatives. The Bundesrat is clearly dominated by geographical self-interest. 
A state government's political fortune is heavily dependent on the well-being of its fellow 
citizens. Thus, as regards the intergovernmental transfer system, a major aim of state 
delegates in the upper house is to maximize financial resources of the state government in 
order to win votes. Coalition-building in the lower house is more likely influenced by 
ideological affiliations or party politics. Geographical self-interest of representatives in the 
lower house is also present as one half of the members of the Bundestag are elected directly 
from local electoral districts, and the second half is elected by a state party list system. 
However, in a parliamentary democracy the federal government coalition depends on the 
political support of a legislative party majority in the lower house (Laver and Shepsle 1996).   14 
Party discipline is of overwhelming importance for voting behavior in the Bundestag, whereas 
a missing support by state delegates in the Bundesrat does not directly intimidate a governing 
coalition at the federal level. It can thus be conjectured that in Germany's parliamentary 
system legislative malapportionment has a larger impact on the distribution of benefits in the 
upper than in the lower house of the federal legislature (Hypothesis 2). 
 
A further question is whether the impact of overrepresentation is dependent on the time period 
under consideration. Intergovernmental redistribution is typically not chosen in an ad hoc 
discretionary bargaining process. Equalization formulas comprise a fixed set of rules that are 
more or less stable for a longer period of time. Most notably when reforms are negotiated and 
new rules come into effect there is an opportunity to change existing redistributive schemes. It 
is therefore of special interest to investigate whether political and economic determinants of 
relative gains and losses remained stable after each major reform. In particular, one may ask if 
negotiations on a revision of the fiscal transfer system affected the relative importance of 
malapportionment and economic conditions for the allocation of benefits among the states. 
Due to an ever-increasing importance of more discretionary special grants on the third stage 
of the transfer system, we conjecture that the effects of overrepresentation might be more 
visible in later time periods (Hypothesis 3). 
 
As the short depiction of the evolution of the German system of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers since 1970 in section 3 suggests, the time period 1970-2002 for which data are 
available might best be divided into sub-periods 1970-86, 1987-94 and 1995-2002. During 
these three sub-periods only minor changes in legal rules of the transfer system occurred. 
Although German Unification in the fall of 1990 altered the composition of Germany's 
legislative institutions6, Eastern states and Berlin have not been incorporated into the transfer 
system until 1995.7 
                                                 
6   Political integration of the new Länder was accompanied by an increasing number of legislators in both 
chambers of the federal legislature, changing the degree of malapportionment slightly. Calculating our 
representation index for the period 1987-94, we only refer to the old states' delegates. 
7   A special problem arises with 1994, where special donations to Bremen and Saarland were introduced. See 
our discussion below.   15 
Figure 4: Over- and underrepresentation in the upper chamber and mean of relative gains 
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Figure 5: Over- and underrepresentation in the lower chamber and mean of relative gains 
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Average relative per capita gains and malapportionment in the lower chamber
 
 
Figures 4 and 5 present the development of the means for received per capita gains grouped 
by overrepresented and underrepresented states in both legislative chambers. Figure 4 shows   16 
that throughout the period as a whole and in all sub-periods overrepresented states in the 
Bundesrat received higher per capita gains on average. Thereby, the differences in means are 
increasing over time indicating a possible surge in the role of political bargaining power for 
the determination of the transfers. While till 1994 the differences in relative per capita gains 
are not statistically significant at a 5%-level of significance – which might partly results from 
the low number of observations – they are highly significant since 1995. 
 
The results for the lower chamber are less convincing (see Figure 5). Averaged over the entire 
period 1970-2002, overrepresented states in the Bundestag received slightly more than 
underrepresented Länder. Though since 1987 the mean of relative per capita gains in the 
overrepresented states is without a single exception higher than in the underrepresented states 
statistical significance is never given. 
 
These simple tests, however, neglect a number of potentially influential factors for the 
determination of fiscal benefits. Hence, the descriptive analysis will be corroborated by a 
more refined and systematic multivariate analysis in the next section. 
 
 
4.2 Multivariate  analysis 
 
In the following empirical tests we make use of the panel structure of the data, employing 
annual figures for all German states over the time period 1970-2002. The five new states and 
Berlin have been incorporated into the system of transfers only since 1995. The panel is 
therefore unbalanced, containing observations for the 10 old Länder from 1970 to 2002 and 
for 6 Länder only from 1995 to 2002, leading to a total of 368 observations.8 
 
                                                 
8   As there is an outlier for the dependent variable for the year 1994 we ran regressions both dropping and 
including observations for the year 1994. The results, however, do not depend on the inclusion of this year's 
data. The results presented are based on the estimations without 1994.   17 
The dependent variable is total relative per capita gains (RELGAIN) of state i at time t from 
all stages of the intergovernmental transfers system. Equal per capita distribution of financial 
resources across states is again normalized to 1. Total relative per capita gains are explained 
by a vector of variables  . The individual effect   accounts for unobserved heterogeneity 






(1)    it ε i u it x β it RELGAIN + + ′ =
 
Before presenting the variables included in   and before discussing the estimation results 
some remarks with respect to the estimation strategy are given. The first decision to be made 
is whether the individual effects are treated as "random" or "fixed". From a theoretical point 
of view there exist arguments in favor of both assumptions. As our data comprises the 
population of all German states and is not a sample this might argue for using a fixed effect 
model. Alike, a simple Hausman test also prefers the estimation of a fixed effect model. 
However, as some of our main control variables – e.g. the dummy for a city state and the 
dummy for the new Länder – are time-constant we cannot control for their impact in a fixed 
effect framework. We therefore estimated both models with random and fixed effects to 
account for the sensitivity of the results. Since the results were rather stable we restrict the 
further presentation to the estimates of FGLS random effect models.9 As different tests for 
serial correlation indicate the existence of first-order autocorrelation we additionally account 
for autocorrelation within panels or panel-specific first-order autocorrelation. Furthermore, we 






                                                 
9    Standard errors were estimated based on the GLS estimates. Alternatively, we also estimated Prais-
Winsten-Regressions with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995), but the results are quite 
the same. We therefore only present results for the GLS estimates.   18 
Table 1: Determinants of relative per capita gains from 1970 to 2002. Results from feasible 




dependent variable: RELGAIN 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RELTAX  -0.428  -0.468      
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***      
yd7086*  RELTAX      -0.589 -0.586 -0.578 -0.620 
      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
yd8794*  RELTAX      -0.470 -0.470 -0.464 -0.487 
      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
yd9502*RELTAX      -0.551 -0.557 -0.546 -0.587 
      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
BRREP  0.525  0.286      
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***      
yd7086*  BRREP      0.159 0.156 0.161 0.165 
      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
yd8794*  BRREP      0.267 0.271 0.271 0.302 
      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
yd9502*BRREP      0.378 0.373 0.375 0.084 
      (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
BTREP  0.029  0.024      
  (0.001)***  (0.008)***      
yd7086*  BTREP      0.009 0.006 0.009 0.003 
      (0.566) (0.729) (0.604) (0.812) 
yd8794*  BTREP      0.031 0.023 0.028 0.003 
      (0.175) (0.319) (0.216) (0.868) 
yd9502*BTREP     -0.014  -0.015  -0.012  0.008 
      (0.417) (0.362) (0.458) (0.555) 
NEWSTATE    0.607 0.453 0.446 0.460 0.601 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
CITY    0.520 0.695 0.689 0.677 0.703 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
yd8794      0.062 0.060 0.059 0.074 
     (0.008)***  (0.010)***  (0.012)**  (0.000)*** 
yd9502     0.145  0.140  0.135  -0.009 
     (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.751) 
A-state      -0.033    -0.035 
      (0.016)**    (0.005)*** 
B-state      -0.018    -0.017 
      (0.142)    (0.123) 
Non-divid*C-state       0.020   
       (0.864)   
Divided*  C-state       0.023   
       (0.044)**   
Constant  1.328 1.108 1.024 1.046 1.026 1.041 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations (id)  368 (16)  368 (16)  368 (16)  368 (16)  368 (16)  368 (16) 
rho  0.939 0.855 0.775 0.779 0.786 0.684 
chi2  1207.729 2031.087 2872.390 2770.239 2748.435 5681.687 
p values in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   19 
Table 1 shows results of our first set of estimates. The very basic model (1) regresses 
RELGAIN only on three main explaining variables: Initial per capita tax receipts before 
redistribution in the transfer system (RELTAX) measures the economic cause of 
intergovernmental transfers. A state’s representation in the upper chamber (BRREP) and in 
the lower chamber (BTREP) of the federal legislature are included to check whether states 
which are overrepresented in the legislative receive a higher share of total transfers per capita. 
In order to test for comparative importance of these main factors in the determination of 
transfers among states, for every year RELTAX, BRREP, and BTREP are standardized to a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in 
the appendix.  
 
Model (2) includes two further covariates. CITY is an indicator for the three city states 
(Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin). All city-states are overrepresented in the upper house, 
though Berlin only moderately. There may be a reason to give higher transfers to city states 
due to spillover effects into the surrounding states. However, Homburg (1997) has shown that 
the Länderfinanzausgleich is not an adequate instrument to correct spillovers. Nevertheless, 
we control for city states even if the economic justification for higher transfers to these states 
is weak at best. We expect a positive sign of the coefficient. NEWSTATE is a dummy 
variable for the five new Länder and Berlin to correct for the unquestionable higher financial 
needs of these states. The sign of NEWSTATE is expected to be positive. 
 
In the basic regressions (1) and (2) all coefficients behave in the predicted manner. RELTAX 
is highly significant and negative, showing that higher initial tax revenues lead to lower 
benefits in the intergovernmental transfer system. BRREP and BTREP both show a positive 
sign, indicating that overrepresented states receive higher benefits. The coefficient of the 
Bundesrat (BRREP) is a multiple larger than the coefficient of the Bundestag (BTREP), 
demonstrating that malapportionment is much more important in the upper than in the lower 
chamber. CITY and NEWSTATE have the expected positive sign at a 1 percent confidence 
level.   20 
Model (3) includes period dummies for 1970-86, 1987-93 and for 1995-2002 as well as 
interaction terms of period dummies with the three variables of interest. In the pre-Unification 
period RELTAX, BRREP, and BTREP still have the expected signs at high confidence levels. 
Interaction terms reveal that initial taxes had a lower impact on total transfers during the 
period 1987-93, while in 1995-2002 the influence of RELTAX on RELGAIN returns roughly 
to its pre-Unification value. Additional Wald tests show that the decline during 1987-1993 is 
statistically significant. 
 
The impact of overrepresentation in the upper chamber (BRREP) on the total level of 
transfers per capita is positive and statistically significant in all the three time periods. 
Moreover, it is remarkable that the importance of the overrepresentation in the upper chamber 
for the total relative per capita gains has grown since 1970. While the estimated coefficient 
was about 0.16 from 1970 to 1986, it increased to 0.27 from 1987 to 1993 and to 0.38 from 
1995 to 2002. Both increases are statistically significant at a 1%-level of significance. For the 
malapportionment in the lower chamber whose impact on the relative per capita transfers was 
already shown to be less in the basic models (1) and (2) there is no significant trend in the 
development over time. After the inclusion of the time variables the joint effect of 
malapportionment in the lower chamber is not statistically significant any more. 
 
Grossman (1994), and Worthington and Dollery (1998) claim with respect to fiscal transfers, 
that state governments with a closer political affinity to the federal government are supposed 
to receive higher transfers.10 This argument, however, takes for granted that central 
government authorities have the discretionary power to target benefits to states at their own 
preference. As noted above the situation is somewhat different in Germany, because both 
houses of the federal legislature have to co-decide on transfers. The federal government 
coalition is more often than not confronted with a majority of state governments composed of 
                                                 
10   Yet, this partisan argument is not that clear-cut. Crain, Leavens, and Tollison (1990) argue with respect to 
pork barrel politics in the U.S. that favors which go to states governed by a similar party as the federal 
government have undesirable consequences if the respective incumbent is defeated in a future election. A 
program that confers benefits to a party affiliate in a certain state might then benefit the previous opposition 
party, et vice versa.   21 
opposition parties in the upper house. Depending on the majority in both legislative chambers, 
the incumbent federal government may then be forced to buy political support of states 
governed by parties belonging to the opposition in the lower house. German political 
scientists (e.g. König and Bräuninger 1997) use the terms A-states, B-states, and C-states to 
depict political affinity of state and federal governments. A-states are governed by coalitions 
which are solely composed of parties that are members of the federal government, too. In B-
states the opposite is the case. C-state governments are composed of incumbent as well as 
opposition parties at the federal level. Model (4) adds two dummy variables for A-states and 
B-states to the set of regressors.11 While coefficients of all other covariates remain almost 
unchanged, A-states and B-states receive a smaller share of total benefits as compared to C-
states, though this effect is only statistically significant for A-states and rather small. This 
result may partly be explained by the need of the federal government to buy majorities in the 
upper chamber, where the C-states often hold a pivotal position.12 Model (5) therefore 
additionally tests whether the relative gains of C-states are larger in periods when the federal 
government does depend on the votes of C-states (1970 to 1982 and 1990 to 2002). It can be 
shown that this effect is indeed positive and statistically significant though with a coefficient 
of 0.02 not very large. 
 
In 1994, the central government started to donate special supplementary grants to the heavily 
indebted states Bremen and Saarland. So far, in our analyses we excluded this period from our 
estimations as this year is a heavy outlier with respect to the dependent variable. Though the 
inclusion of the year 1994 does not severely change the general results additional insights can 
be gained by omitting special grants to Bremen and Saarland, intended to mitigate budgetary 
problems of both states (Sanierungs-BEZ), out of the calculation of RELGAIN (see Model 
(6)). The results show that the impact of BRREP would have dropped down to levels even 
less than the corresponding levels in the period from 1970 to 1986 if special favors were not 
                                                 
11   Our coding of a state depends on the timing of the last elections. If elections were held in the first 6 months, 
the state government is coded according to the result of the respective year's election. Otherwise, a change 
in the government coalition only becomes relevant for the next year. 
12   We also tested for differences in the coefficients in the (rare) cases when a federal government is not 
dependent on B- or C-states. However, we found no dissimilarity.   22 
introduced. One may speculate, then, that the introduction of special grants to Bremen and 
Saarland was indeed necessary to maintain a political equilibrium in the upper house of the 
federal legislature. The inclusion of the five new Länder and Berlin otherwise might have 
destroyed a previous bargaining equilibrium. 
 
Summing up, we find considerable evidence for a positive effect of overrepresentation in the 
Bundesrat on relative gains in the intergovernmental transfer system (Hypothesis 1). We can 
also not reject Hypothesis 2 that malapportionment is more important for the determination of 
gains in the upper house as compared to the lower house. Additional evidence is also found in 
support of Hypothesis 3 that bargaining powers in the upper house became an increasingly 
important factor in an explanation of the distribution of relative gains over time. This result 
however depends on the inclusion of special bail-out grants to the two most overrepresented 
states of Bremen and Saarland in 1994. One can only hypothesize whether underrepresented 
states like Northrhine-Westphalia would have received the same amount of transfers in face of 
a severe budget crisis (Homburg 1997). 
 
 
5  Discussion and outlook 
 
Modern legislative bargaining theory implies that fiscal transfers among member states of a 
federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. 
Disproportional representation of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to benefit 
overrepresented states. Our results clearly confirm that malapportionment in the upper house 
of the German legislature leads to disproportional state shares of per capita transfers. In 
particular, overrepresented states receive higher benefits per person, even though we control 
for initial tax receipts prior to redistribution, as well as special needs of city states and of the 
new Länder. Results also indicate that the impact of overrepresentation has increased over 
time. One might therefore claim that the German intergovernmental transfer system has 
become more 'politicized'.   23 
It can yet be objected that intergovernmental redistribution is not chosen in an ad hoc 
discretionary bargaining process. Equalization formulas are typically characterized by a fixed 
set of rules that are quite stable for a longer period of time. Thus, it would be inappropriate to 
model the determination of relative gains and losses of the states as a result of annual political 
bargaining. Only at the time when revisions are negotiated there would be an opportunity to 
change existing redistributive schemes. Our results are visibly in line with this argument, as 
we can show that major shifts in the importance of overrepresentation in the determination of 
transfers are associated with negotiations over a reform of the transfer system. 
 
One may finally ask, what are the prospects in favor of a reform? Experience of the most 
recent reform in 2001 do not leave too much space for optimism. As Rodden (2002, p. 160) 
points out, state delegates are generally well aware of the future distributional consequences 
of certain regulations when entering negotiations. Political decisions on the rules that govern 
intergovernmental transfers are never isolated from the distributional consequences of these 
rules, as long as agents do not act behind an ideal veil of uncertainty. Being aware of that 
problem, in its 1999 decision Germany's Constitutional Court referred to this well known 
notion from Constitutional Economics. To limit free bargaining among state and federal 
government officials in the negotiations for fiscal transfers, the Court insisted on a two step 
procedure to a reform of fiscal relations in order to arrive at a clear separation of a choice of 
rules from a choice within rules (Buchanan 1987). Firstly, the Court demanded legislators to 
frame a set of universal standards ('Maßstäbegesetz') for the vertical and horizontal 
distribution of revenues. Secondly, rules in the 'Maßstäbegesetz' should serve as a guideline 
for a more specific statute, that is required to contain more precise and technical regulations 
which allow to calculate the flow of financial resources between the states and the federal 
level. Delegates of Bund and Länder, however, adhered to that procedure only formally. In 
sharp contrast to the spirit of the Court's judgment, both statutory rulings have been decided 
on by Chancellor Schröder (representing the Bund) and state prime ministers in a single 
informal session in June of 2001. Seen from this view it might not come as a surprise that the 
most recent reform of the German fiscal transfer system, which is in effect since 2005, does   24 
not appear to change substantially redistribution towards states that are overrepresented in 
Germany's upper chamber (Pitlik 2004). An almost four year lag of reform implementation 
appears to be far too short to create a sufficient degree of distributional uncertainty. 
 
One might also argue that any serious reform should deal with malapportionment in the upper 
chamber, which it is at the heart of the considered problems. Yet, disproportionality of 
representation is rooted in constitutional rules or electoral laws that are sticky over time. 
Substantial changes of the bargaining powers of states only occur (i) if state population 
changes dramatically, or (ii) if underlying constitutional or electoral rules are amended. There 
is, however, no reason to expect overrepresented states to sacrifice constitutionally guaranteed 
bargaining powers to adjust states' voting rights in the upper chamber accordingly. A more 
feasible way may be to re-organize German Federalism according to Article 29 of the 
Constitution which offers the option of a Länderneugliederung, i.e. a fusion of states. A 
longer debate in Germany about a union of certain weaker states, or a fusion of city states 
with neighboring states, illustrates that Länder governments are not willing to give up their 
status as an independent political entity.13 Mounting fiscal problems in the states of Bremen, 
Berlin, and Saarland may yet create incentives to merge with economically stronger states and 
thus set the stage for a revision of voting weights in the German Bundesrat.14 
                                                 
13   Although Germany's constitution in 1949 already included that option, Germany only observed one single 
case of a fusion of states in 1951. 
14   See Barbera and Jackson (2004) for a normative treatment of voting weights of nations.   25 
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
RELGAIN  378  1.29 0.71 -0.19 4.37 
RELTAX 378  0  0.96 -1.47 2.50 
BRREP  378  0  0.96 -1.08 3.02 
BTREP  378  0  0.96 -2.48 2.43 
CITY 378  0.20  0.40  0  1 
NEWSTATE 378  0.13  0.13  0  1 
A-STATE 378  0.37  0.48  0  1 
B-STATE 378  0.46  0.50  0  1 
C-STATE 378  0.17  0.38  0  1 
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